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Abstract 
This paper investigates if educational attainment among females when they are young affects the 
incidence of child marriage. There is a general agreement that education delays the time of marriage 
and thus works as a protective factor against child marriage. However, there is no causal estimate of 
education on age at marriage. By using educational variation induced from the Indonesian Sekolah 
Dasar INPRES program among ethnic groups engaged in bride pricing, and information about age at 
marriage from the Indonesian Intercensal Survey (SUPAS) in 1995, I estimate the effect of education 
on child marriage for females. Despite strong cross-sectional correlations, instrumental variable 
analysis estimates suggest that there is no causal effect of primary education on child marriage. Also, 
there is no evidence of educational spillovers from primary to secondary education, that could have a 
more important role in raising the age at marriage.  
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1. Introduction 
 
   In the developing world, certain cultural norms and traditional cultural practices are known 
to nourish gender inequality and to violate human rights of women. One highly condemned 
custom is child marriage, which is defined as a formal or informal marriage before the age of 
18 (UNICEF, 2014). Another controversial custom is the practice of bride pricing, i.e. when 
the family of the bride receives a payment of the groom at the time of marriage (Ashraf et al 
2014). 
   While there is a consensus that education works as a protective factor against child 
marriage, researchers have found contradictory results when it comes to the relationship 
between bride pricing and child marriage. On one hand there is evidence suggesting that bride 
pricing creates incentives for parents to marry girls at an early age. On the other hand bride 
pricing is an income generating activity, which might protect against child marriage (Global, 
2007). Recently, Ashraf et al (2014) showed that ethnic groups involved in bride pricing are 
associated with increased female educational attainment. More specifically, higher female 
education is associated with a higher bride price payment which increases parental incentives 
to invest in girl’s schooling. These rather ambiguous results raise a vital question, namely; 
does the bride price custom allow women to benefit from their increased education by 
delaying the time of marriage? If it does, it implies consistency of the interaction between 
bride pricing and educational policies to fight child marriage. If it does not, it means that bride 
pricing entails discriminating social norms and traditions against women which ultimately 
make their education worthless in the aspect of child marriage.  
   On this base, the purpose of this paper is to study the causal effect of education on child 
marriage in the context of bride pricing. To make it possible I take advantage of the Sekolah 
Dasar INPRES programme, a major school construction program that took place in Indonesia 
in the 1970s. It is widely recognized that education might be correlated with unobservable 
personal features such as parental preferences and cultural traditions. This creates a serious 
problem when trying to estimate the causal effect of education on child marriage. By 
exploiting the INPRES program however, the problem is solved since the unobserved features 
are uncorrelated with the change in educational attainment brought on by this program.  
   The INPRES program was initially studied by Duflo (2000) to estimate the effect of 
education on wages for men. Recently Ashraf et al (2014) estimated the impact of the 
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INPRES program on girls’ educational attainment and showed that it was positively 
associated with girls’ schooling, but only for girls whose parents engaged in the bride pricing 
custom. In contrast to Ashraf et al (2014) I am estimating the causal effect of education on 
child marriage for girls belonging to ethnic groups that make bride price payments at 
marriage. I do this by using a difference-in-difference technique and an instrumental variable 
approach. First I confirm that there only seems to be an effect of female education for girls 
from ethnic groups that practice bride pricing, as previously shown by Ashraf et al (2014). 
Then I use the exogenous variation in program exposure to estimate the causal effect of 
education on child marriage.  
   Aside from increasing our knowledge about the effect of education on child marriage, this 
paper provides with additional knowledge of how cultural traditions interact with 
development policies. The literature is scarce when it comes to the relationship between 
native family characteristics and age of marriage. Furthermore, due to the contradictory 
evidence concerning the relationship between bride pricing and chid marriage, this knowledge 
is essential in order for educational policies to have a desired impact on child marriages. 
Without it policy actions with good intentions might wrongly stimulate a practice that is 
already discriminative by nature. Although I find a strong relationship between primary 
education and child marriage, I find no evidence that primary education has a causal effect on 
child marriage. Also I find no evidence of educational spillovers, in the sense that completion 
of primary school does not affect completion of secondary school. Finally the data suggests 
that the regions with the highest prevalence rates of child marriage in Indonesia are not 
characterized by bride pricing. 
   The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 presents the 
institutional context and section 4 describes the INPRES program, data and the outcome 
variables of child marriage in detail. Section 5 describes the model specification and section 6 
displays the results. The results are further discussed in section 7. Finally, section 8 
concludes.  
2. Related Literature 
 
      Various studies have discussed the phenomenon of child marriage in the developing 
world. In a broad sense these studies can be divided into two groups; one focusing on the 
negative consequences of child marriage and the other one focusing on means to reduce child 
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marriage. A dominant part of the research is focused on the consequences of marrying young, 
while much less is understood about factors protecting against child marriage. Although the 
consequences of child marriage is not the central target of the paper, this part of the research 
field will briefly be presented in order to portray the nature of child marriage.  
2.1 Consequences of Child Marriage  
   Due to the abundant literature reporting a strong association between child marriage and 
numerous negative consequences, child marriage is acknowledged as an obstacle to 
development and as a human rights violation (Global, 2007). Intuitively, marrying at a young 
age implies sexual activity at a young age. Some of the most outspoken negative outcomes 
associated with child marriage are poor maternal health and child morbidity. The reason is 
that there is evidence suggesting that girls within child marriages experience a pressure of 
having to prove their reproductive ability early after marriage. Furthermore, they often lack 
knowledge about reproductive health and the power to impact decisions about family 
planning (Mathur et al, 2003). Another severe consequence of child marriage is that it 
interrupts girls’ schooling, leading to high levels of school drop outs and low educational 
attainment (Save the Children, 2004). Typically, married girls cannot benefit from neither 
education nor work opportunities because of restricted mobility, household duties and cultural 
limitations (Mathur et al., 2003). Due to the fact that young brides also have little access to 
resources, a strong relationship between child marriage and poverty has been reported (Singh 
and Samara, 1996). Finally, the lack of decision making power is associated with a greater 
risk of experiencing domestic violence and sexual abuse (UNICEF 2005; Jenson and 
Thornton 2003).  
2.2 Means to Reduce Child Marriage  
   The means to reduce child marriage has also received some, although not far enough, 
attention throughout the economic development research field. Two important protective 
factors against child marriage have been defined. The first factor is for girls to engage in 
income generating activities. Previous research shows a strong correlation between poverty 
and child marriage. Child marriage is most common in countries with the lowest gross 
domestic product and subsequently, within the poorest households (ICRW, 2006; UNICEF, 
2005). According to Mathur et al. (2003) the reason is that apart from marriage, parents do not 
feel like they have neither the resources nor the incentives to invest in other alternatives for 
their daughters. There are two different factors behind this perception. First, daughters may be 
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seen as an economic burden which alleviates through marriage. Second, the practice of dowry 
or bride price may create a monetary incentive to marrying daughters at an early age 
(Berhane-Selaisse 1993; Ensminger and Knight 1997). Thus when a girl earns income, 
parents may feel less obliged to marrying them at a young age (Jejeebhoy, 1995).  
 
   The second protective factor against child marriage is education. There is a strong 
correlation between higher levels of education and a reduced risk of child marriage. It has 
been shown that especially girls with secondary education are less likely to be exposed to 
child marriage (NRC/IOM, 2005). However, there is evidence suggesting that even primary 
education may protect against child marriage. In Senegal for example, 36 percent of women 
who did not complete primary school were married before the age of 18. For women who 
completed primary school, 20 percent were married before the age of 18 (UNICEF, 2005). 
The reason why education is seen as a protective factor against child marriage is because 
education increases girls’ independence and the power to impact time of marriage as well as 
the selection of a partner (Lloyd and Mensch 1999; NRC/IOM 2005). 
 
3. Institutional Context  
 
   In order to evaluate the effect of education on child marriage in the context of bride pricing, 
this study requires an understanding of the cultural practice of bride pricing as well as the 
history of child marriage in Indonesia.  
 
3.1 Bride Pricing   
   First, it is important to note that the execution and meaning of bride pricing differs both 
within and across countries (Ashraf et al, 2014). This implies that the negative aspects of the 
bride pricing custom are conditional on the cultural context. As an illustration, the public 
debate of the downsides of the bride price custom is especially prevalent in Africa (Ashraf et 
al, 2014). The arguments against bride pricing typically lie in the commodification of women 
due to the monetary transaction between the family of the bride and the groom. In the case of 
Indonesia however, this idea is rejected since bride pricing is expressed as 
“a compensation for the expenses, the care and the trouble spent on the bride’s upbringing.     
[…] It is compensation for the complete loss of a worker as a bride withdraws from her own 
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kindred an henceforth belongs to her husband’s.” (Vroklage 1952, 1891; cited by Ashraf et al, 
2014). 
 Second, it is important to note the role played by religion. Today 82.7 percent of the total 
Indonesian population are Muslims. However, there is evidence rejecting the idea of Islam as 
the reason for bride pricing in Indonesia. Kressel (1977) states that the practice of bride 
pricing goes back to “adat” which developed prior to the conversion to Islam.1 Third, many 
arguments have been made that bride pricing creates incentives for parents to educate girls, 
and thus represents a tradition of gratitude for women. Ashraf et al (2014) emphasize parents’ 
awareness about bride pricing working as a future cash-flow which compensates for 
providence of the elderly. Furthermore, the mediators of bride pricing are aware of the fact 
that education increases the amount of bride price. This has led to media promoting brides in 
Indonesia to know that their price increases along with their increased level of schooling 
(Ashraf et al 2014). 
3.2 Child marriage   
   Child marriage is highly prevalent in the developing world, as more than 30 percent of girls 
across developing countries are married under the age of 18. At the same time more than 10 
percent are married before turning 15. South Asia and West and Central Africa experience the 
highest prevalence rates of child marriages. As for Indonesia, it is ranked as one of the top ten 
countries in the world with child brides, where one out of five girls is married before turning 
18 (UNFPA, 2014). Indonesia was colonialized by the Dutch in the seventeenth century. 
During that time, the Dutch allowed the contemporary customary and religious laws in 
Indonesia to coexist with their own law (Katz and Katz, 1975). The Indonesian population 
was ultimately divided into three groups; Europeans; Natives and Foreign Orientals. The latter 
two were contingent on their own customary law, whereas the Europeans were contingent on 
Dutch law. This implied that a superior part of the indigenous Indonesians were controlled by 
unwritten customary laws which concerned all marital affairs. The complexity of these 
unwritten laws was substantial, since they were divided into 19 different adat systems. To 
make matters even more complex, Islamic law influenced most of the adat systems (Katz and 
Katz, 1975).  
                                                          
1
 Adat is a customary law practices by the indigenous people from Indonesia and Malaysia (Davidson and 
Henley, 2007) 
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   The tension between adat and Islamic leadership groups led to the establishment of separate 
courts, where marital questions were under the jurisdiction of Islamic court. In the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, the Muslim marriage law was challenged by women due to the lack 
of certainty of their human rights. In 1945 a larger movement for independence of women 
succeeded in guaranteeing equal right for men and women regarding the right to work, the 
right for education and the right to civil liberties. For almost twenty years, various marriage 
law reforms were proposed yet never implemented due to the failure of reconciliation between 
the conflicting government groups. In 1974, the National Marriage Act was implemented 
which was the first jurisdictive amendment of Indonesia’s marriage and divorce law. To this 
day, and in line with the Marriage Law, the minimum age of marriage for girls is 16 with 
parental consent and 18 for boys (Cammack et al 1996).  
4. Empirical strategy   
 
4.1 The School Construction Program  
   The Sekolah Dasar INPRES program was implemented across districts in the 1970s 
Indonesia. INPRES stands for “presidential instructions” and it has been the institutional 
apparatus that redistributes aggregate revenues from the central government to the provincial 
government since 1973 (Ravaillon, 1993). Today it makes grants to numerous societal 
projects and has evolved into a detailed and elaborated system (Duflo, 2000). The Sekolah 
Dasar INPRES program was launched in 1973. During the second year of the five year 
program, emphasis changed from sectoral and infrastructure development to regional 
development. As a result, regional development was assigned 15 percent of the national 
budget in 1973 and 12 percent of the regional development budget was in turn allocated to the 
Sekolah Dasar INPRES program. This is to be compared with health expenditures which only 
represented 3.4 percent of the national budget in 1973 (Hoffman, 2013). Thus the Sekolah 
Dasar INPRES program was one of the first and largest INPRES programs ever launched.  
   As a result of the program, 61,807 schools were built between 1973-1974 and 1978-1979, 
doubling the number of existing schools in Indonesia. This represented one school per every 
500 children aged 5-14 in 1971 (Duflo, 2000). Each school was planned identically with 120 
students and 3 teachers per school. The central government employed teachers and paid their 
wages as soon as an INPRES school was built. Children whom were not previously enrolled 
in primary school were the central target of the program. Therefore the allocation rule 
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explicitly stated that the number of constructed schools per district was to be proportional to 
the number of primary school aged children not enrolled in school (Hoffman, 2013). 
4.2 Identification strategy 
   From the program description above, two factors affecting the intensity of the program are 
identified; year of birth and region of birth. This represents the difference-in-difference 
estimation and the first stage of the IV approach. The normal age of attending primary school 
in Indonesia is 6-12. Children born in 1962 or earlier (age 12 or older in 1974) were thus not 
exposed to the program and form the control group in the analysis. Consequently, children 
born in 1968 or later (age 6 or younger in 1974) were fully exposed to the program and form 
the treatment group. In line with Duflo (2000) and Asharf et al (2014), children partially 
exposed to the program are dropped from the analysis.  
  According to Duflo (2000) there was a very strong correlation between region of birth and 
the region where children aged 12 went to school , which implies that most children at age 12 
were still living in the region they were born. However, migration could introduce a problem. 
If caring parents move to a high program region between the birth of their child and his (her) 
age of education, and this goes by unnoticed, it will look like there is a smaller effect of the 
program on the child’s schooling than it actually is. Thus, migration will underestimate the 
effect of the program and lead to a downward bias. Yet Duflo (2000) shows that region of 
birth cannot be endogenous with regard to the program. Since the program started after all 
children in the sample were born, parents could not have moved to a high program region 
prior to the birth of their child since they could not possibly have been aware of the program 
at the time.  
4.3 Data 
   To identify program exposure, I need to know in which year and in which district 
individuals are born. I use data on year of birth and district of birth from the 1995 Indonesia 
Intercensal Survey (SUPAS). SUPAS is a national wide population survey covering over 
200,000 individuals and it is provided by the Minnesota Population Center. Individuals born 
between 1968 and 1972 form the treatment group since they are guaranteed full program 
exposure. Individuals born between 1950 and 1962 form the control group. I drop individuals 
born between 1963 and 1967 from the analysis.  
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   I also need to know how the intensity of the program varied across districts. For this I use 
data on the number of INPRES schools constructed per 1,000 school-aged children in 1971. 
In line with Duflo (2000) and Ashraf et al. (2014) I use control variables comprising 
information about the enrolment rate in 1971, the number of school-aged children in 1971 and 
the exposure to a water and sanitation program which was the second largest INPRES 
program.
2
 
   In order to identify females that engage in bride pricing, I use information on ethnic groups’ 
traditional bride price customs from the Ethnographic Atlas. The Ethnographic Atlas contains 
traditional bride price information on over 1,100 pre-industrial societies (Murdock, 1967). 
Ethnic groups are typically defined through a local mother tongue. The SUPAS contains 
information on 174 local mother tongues. In line with Ashraf et al (2014) I manually match 
these languages in SUPAS to the ethnic groups in the Ethnographic Atlas. However, due to 
the extensive time lag between SUPAS and the Ethnographic Atlas, as well as the less precise 
categorization of ethnic groups in the Ethnographic Atlas, not all mother tongues from 
SUPAS could be matched to the corresponding ethnic groups. More specifically, 12 of the 
174 mother tongues from the SUPAS could not be matched to the Ethnographic Atlas. Also, 
due to the fact that SUPAS contain languages not listed in the Ethnographic Atlas, each 
language in SUPAS was matched to the Ethnologue: Languages of the World (Gordon, 2005), 
which comprises information about over 7,000 language groups. A final note worth 
mentioning is that multiple mother tongues are matched to one single ethnic group in the 
Ethnographic Atlas (Ashraf et al, 2014). The manual matching procedure results in 27 final 
ethnic groups in SUPAS.
3
 Table 1 displays the distribution and definition of the various 
marriage customs for these 27 final groups. Like Ashraf et al (2014) I generate a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if an ethnic group engages in bride pricing and/or bride service.                                                                                                              
In order to identify educational attainment, I use data from SUPAS which comprises 
information on highest completed educational degree. This I use to ascribe number of years of 
schooling. I also use this information to construct a dummy variable equal to one if the 
number of years of schooling is equal or greater than 6, which represents completion of 
primary school.                                                                                                                     
   SUPAS also asks about a woman’s age at the time of her first marriage. I use this 
information to construct a dummy variable equal to one if a woman was younger than 18 
                                                          
2
 Data on the INPRES program was generously provided by prof. Duflo.  
3
Despite multiple efforts, I was not able to replicate Ashraf et al (2014) match of 28 final ethnic groups.  
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when she first got married and zero otherwise. As the Indonesian Marriage Law is not in line 
with the  international definition of child marriage, I also construct a dummy variable equal to 
one if a woman  was younger than 16 when she first got married..  
   Summary statistics are provided in table 2. As illustrated, males went to school on average 
1.2 years longer than females in 1995. Furthermore, on average 2 INPRES schools were built 
per district. Finally, the mean bride pricing female is almost 2 years older than the mean non-
bride pricing female.  
5.  Model Specification  
 
   The model specification is based on a two-staged least squares estimation of the impact of 
education on child marriage. In order to define the first stage equation however, the baseline 
equation of Duflo (2000) and Ashraf et al (2014) need first be presented. The baseline 
equation of Duflo (2000) is: 
Yidk  =   k + d + 1Ik
Post
 * Intensityd + ∑jX’dIk
j
Tj + idk                                                         (1) 
where Yidk is either the number of completed school years or the completion of primary school 
by individual i in birth district d and birth year k. k and d  are birth cohort and district fixed 
effects. Ik
Post 
 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual is born between 1968-1972 and 
thus fully benefits from the program. Intensityd is the number of schools per 1,000 school-
aged children in birth district d. ∑jX’dIk
j
Tj controls for birth cohort fixed effect interacted with 
the number of school aged children in the district in 1971, the enrolment rate in 1971 and the 
exposure to an INPRES water and sanitation program.  
   The baseline equation of Ashraf et al (2014) is: 
   Yiedk   =   1Ik
Post
 * Intensityd * Ie
NoBridePrice 
 + 2Ik
Post
 * Intensityd * Ie
BridePrice  
+ kIe
NoBridePrice 
 
+   kIe
BridePrice 
 + e + eIk
Post 
 + eIntensityd + dIe
NoBridePrice 
 + dIe
BridePrice 
+ 
Ie
NoBridePrice∑X’dIk
j
Tj + Ie
BridePrice∑X’dIk
j
Tj +  idk,                                                                  (2)                                                                                                                                                                                                  
where Yiedk  is a dummy variable equal to 1 for primary school completion or years of 
schooling of female i in ethnic group e within birth district d born in year k. All variables are 
constructed as in equation 1. Ie
NoBridePrice 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ethnic group 
does not make bride price payments at marriage. Respectively, Ie
BridePrice 
is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the ethnic group does make bride price payments at marriage. The interaction 
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variables 1Ik
Post
 * Intensityd * Ie
NoBridePrice 
 and 2Ik
Post
 * Intensityd * Ie
BridePrice  
thus measure 
the influence of the school construction program independently for ethnic groups that make 
bride price payments at marriage and for those that do not. dIe
NoBridePrice
,
 dIe
BridePrice
, 
kIe
NoBridePrice 
and kIe
BridePrice
 denote district fixed effect and birth cohort fixed effect varying 
depending on ethnic groups. Ethnicity fixed effect is further interacted with the dummy 
variable for the treatment group:  eIk
Post 
  and also with the intensity of the school 
construction program: eIntensityd. Finally, the control variables from equation 1 are 
interacted with the dummy variables for bride pricing and no bride pricing.  
   The first stage equation is: 
Yiedk  =   k + d + e + 1Ik
Post
 * Intensityd + eIk
Post 
 + eIntensityd + ∑jX’dIk
j
Tj + idk,           (3)      
which is a reduced form of equation 2. The sample comprises only females from ethnic 
groups that practice bride pricing. Bear in mind how the school construction program was 
only positively associated with school enrolment for females whose parents engaged in the 
bride price custom. Thus, the first stage generates an instrument for variation in education for 
ethnic groups that practice bride pricing.  
   The second stage equation and the equation of interest is:  
Childiedk = Yiedk Xiedk + idk,                                                                                       (4) 
where Childiedk is a dummy variable equal to one if a girl is married before the age of 18 or 
16, and zero otherwise. The model-estimated values from the first stage are now used in the 
second stage to instrument for the increased education. Thus, is the main parameter of 
interest since it reflects the causal effect of education on child marriage. Furthermore, Xiedk is 
a vector of the same control variables stated in equation 3.                         
6. Results  
 
6.1 First stage 
   First, the relationship between program exposure and years of schooling as well as program 
exposure and completion of primary school is analysed. Table 4 presents the replicated results 
of Ashraf et al (2014) and thus displays the results from equation 1. Arbitrary autocorrelation 
across cohort and heteroscedasticity are permitted through the clustering of standard errors at 
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the district level. All columns include birth cohort fixed effect, district fixed effects and the 
control variables of Duflo (2000). In line with Ashraf et al (2014) I find that program 
exposure increased years of schooling and completion of primary school for males, but not for 
females. More formally, program exposure increased education by 0.197 years for men. The 
results from the first stage are presented in columns (3) and (4) in table 5 and thus represent 
the results from equation 3. Table 5 also adds controls for female agriculture and 
matrilocality. The reason for including these controls is that ethnic groups involved in bride 
pricing may be associated with specific ethnicity-level characteristics that affect their 
exposure to the school construction program. Boserup (1970) have argued that ethnic groups 
practising bride pricing are characterized by agriculture where women play a dominant role. 
There might be a relationship between female dominated agriculture and high female labor 
force participation, which increases returns to education and thus affects program exposure. 
(Alesina et al 2013). Furthermore, high agricultural participation is particularly prevalent in 
rural areas, which might also affect program exposure. Another potential characteristic is 
matrilocality, i.e. when a couple is living with the bride’s family (Ashraf et al, 2104). There is 
evidence suggesting that matrilocality is associated with increased female education, which in 
turn might also affect program exposure. (Bau, 2014). The Ethnographic Atlas comprises 
information about matrilocality and female dominated agriculture. Therefore I create a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if an ethnic group was traditionally characterized by female 
dominated agriculture and matrilocality. The dummies are then separately interacted with 
ethnicity fixed effects. 
   As illustrated, the estimate for females is positive and highly significant for females 
engaged in bride pricing, while it is much smaller and insignificant for females not engaged in 
bride pricing.  
6.2 Second stage   
   The causal effect of completion of primary school on child marriage is presented in table 6. 
All estimates are presented for females from ethnic groups engaged in bride pricing, since 
they were the only females who benefitted from the program. Column (1) in table 6 shows the 
estimate of the OLS relationship between completion of primary school and child marriage. In 
line with the evidence from the literature, primary education has a negative and highly 
significant effect on child marriage. The coefficient estimate in column (1) implies that 
completion of primary school is associated with a 10.9 percentage point decrease in the 
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probability of child marriage exposure. However, the IV estimates in column (2)-(5) are not 
significantly different from zero, suggesting that completion of primary school does not affect 
child marriage. In column (2) and (3) the benchmark specification is presented, which is the 
international definition of child marriage according to UNICEF (2014). Surprisingly, the IV 
estimate suggests that completion of primary school has no significant effect on child 
marriage. This is in great contrast to the OLS estimate. In column (4) and (5) the dependent 
variable is the Indonesian legal age of marriage, which is 16 for girls with parental consent. 
Also in this case the estimate is insignificant.  
   OLS estimates the relationship between education and child marriage, without taking 
program exposure into account. IV analysis estimates the causal effect of education on child 
marriage, by using program exposure as an instrument for education. The difference between 
the OLS results and the IV results can be referred to the local average treatment effect 
(LATE). It has been shown that when the evaluated treatment does not have the same effect 
for all individuals, we can only be certain that the IV method measures the average treatment 
effect among individuals who react to an instrument and, subsequently, change their treatment 
status because of it (Oreopoulos, 2006).  
7. Discussion 
  
   It is very important not to confuse the insignificant results from the second stage with 
accepting the null hypothesis. The reason is that it is practically impossible to tell the 
difference between a null effect and a very small effect. So how should one interpret the 
results? The correct answer is that there is no plausible indication that female primary 
education, brought on by the Sekolah Dasar INPRES program, reduced the risk of child 
marriage in Indonesia for this particular time period. However, at the same time there is no 
evidence that female primary education did not reduce the risk of child marriage. To prove the 
negativity is beyond our reach.   
   By looking at table 2 we notice that females engaged in bride pricing do get married later 
than females not engaged in bride pricing; the mean age of marriage is 19.96 for bride pricing 
females compared to 18.15 for non-bride pricing females. Yet, the difference is not 
significant. This implies that the marital age difference between the two groups might be 
induced by something other than education.  Furthermore, table 3 provides with some other 
very important information. That is, the reason for the insignificant results is not because 
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child marriages do not occur, because they do.  More specifically 2,351 girls involved in bride 
pricing are married before turning 18, which is 27 percent of all females involved in bride 
pricing from the sample. These statistics are representative for the country as a whole; recall 
that one out of five girls is married before turning 18 in Indonesia.  
7.1 Educational Spillovers 
   Based on these finding, the next step is to observe at what age child marriage actually takes 
place in Indonesia. From the data in table 3 we notice that female child marriage most 
frequently occurs between the age of 13 and 17. In educational levels this corresponds to 
junior- and senior high school. Up until now I have only examined the effect of completion of 
primary school on child marriage. However, it may be that girls’ primary education influence 
higher educational levels. Therefore I am estimating the causal effect of primary schooling on 
secondary schooling to control for potential educational spillovers. The results are presented 
in table 7. In column (1) the dependent variable is completion of junior high school and in 
column (2) the dependent variable is completion of secondary high school. As illustrated, 
there are no signs that completion of primary education affects completion of secondary 
education.  
    If one were to speculate, there are two possible explanations for why the Sekolah Dasar 
INPRES program did not lead to higher educational levels for girls. One, after completion of 
primary school, there were no secondary schools available. Two, after completion of primary 
school, parents choose not to send their daughters to secondary school. The first explanation 
would imply that the large supply of primary schools, on behalf of the Sekolah Dasar INPRES 
program, was not accompanied by the equal supply of secondary schools. Bjork (2003) 
reports that the transition between primary to secondary schooling began to decline in 1981, 
just 2 years after the Sekolah Dasar INPRES program was completed. He also states that 
nearly 8 percent of all students in junior high school dropped out per year. Furthermore, the 
World Band (1989) reports that the graduates of primary school grew rapidly, exceeding the 
growth rate of secondary school capacity during the 1970s Indonesia.  
   However, when looking at the effect of program exposure on completion of junior high 
school, there is a positive and significant effect for males, yet not for any females. This is 
illustrated in table 8, where column (1) shows the estimate for males which is positive and 
significant at the five percent level, whereas the estimates for females divided into bride 
pricing females and non-bride pricing females are not significantly different from zero. Given 
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the fact that public schools are co-ed in Indonesia, the implication of these findings suggests 
that secondary schools were in fact available, although the program only had an effect on 
higher levels of education for males (Bedi and Garg, 2000). 
   This leads us to the second explanation which concerns parent’s incentives to invest in girls’ 
education. Using a hedonic regression, Ashraf et al (2014) show that higher education is 
associated with a higher bride price. More specifically, the bride price payment is associated 
with a 100 percent increase if a girl completes primary school, an additional 40 percent if she 
finishes junior secondary high and another 100 percent if she finishes college. On condition 
that secondary schools were available, it may be that parents value getting a 100 percent 
increase in the bride price payment from primary school completion more than to obtain an 
additional 40 percent increase in the bride price payment by letting their daughters continue to 
study for another three years.  
7.2 Provincial differences  
   Another important implication from the results in table 3 is that the bride pricing custom 
may not be equivalent to more frequent child marriages. According to Jones and Gubhaju 
(2008) there are great interprovincial differences regarding the prevalence of child marriage in 
Indonesia. More specifically, they report that South Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, Papua, 
Bangka-Belitung, West Nusa Tenggara, Gorontalo and East Java have the highest prevalence 
rates of child marriages. When observing the data, it is clear that although bride pricing and 
child marriages exist in the same provinces, there are great interprovincial differences in the 
frequency of bride pricing and child marriages. The greatest differences occurs in Central, 
West and East Java, which have the highest numbers of female child marriage and at the same 
time, the lowest numbers of females engaged in bride pricing for the entire sample. In East 
and Central Java for example, the bride pricing females which are also married before turning 
18 make up for less than 0.1 percent of the total number of female child marriages. This 
implies that the provinces with the strongest need for preventable actions against child 
marriages are not characterized by bride pricing.  
8. Conclusion  
   I take advantage of the Sekolah Dasar INRES program, and use the increased educational 
attainment brought on by this program, to estimate the causal effect of completion of primary 
schooling on child marriage for females engaged in bride pricing. I find no evidence of a 
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causal effect of primary school completion on child marriage. Also I find no evidence of 
educational spillovers; completion of primary school does not affect completion of secondary 
school.  
   These findings do not necessarily imply that child marriage is not partly determined by 
educational policies. I have studied a primary school construction program. Children finish 
primary school at age 12. The girls suffering from child marriage in Indonesia are particularly 
aged 13-17. For primary school to decrease the probability of child marriage exposure, it 
implies that girls typically get married when they are supposed to be in primary school. Girls 
aged 13-17 are in junior and senior high school. This indicates that educational policies 
should be targeted towards the most prevalent child marriage ages for education to work as a 
protective factor against child marriage. Thus, in the case of Indonesia, a secondary school 
program might have had a greater chance to impact the prevalence of child marriage than a 
primary school program. Furthermore, the data suggests that the regions with the highest 
prevalence rates of child marriage in Indonesia are not characterized by bride pricing. Thus, 
females engaged in bride pricing are not in most need of preventable actions against child 
marriages in Indonesia.   
   Finally, the fact that there is a marital age difference between bride pricing females and non-
bride pricing females requires further investigation. It might be the case that the difference is 
induced by something other than education. Stronger decision making power within the 
household is one potential outcome of increased education, which might lead to a girl being 
able to bargain with her parents and delay the time of her marriage. Due to absence of data on 
decision-making power in SUPAS, it is unfortunately beyond the scope of the paper to 
examine this relationship. However, the study of this question is strongly encouraged for 
future investigation.  
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Table 1. Distribution of Marriage Customs 
 
 Number of ethnic groups 
Bride Price 13 
Bride Service 2 
Token Bride Price 2 
Gift Exchange 2 
Exchange of Sister or Female Relative 4 
Nothing 4 
Notes: According to Murdock (1957) the marriage customs are defined as follows:  
(1) “Bride price, i.e., marriages normally involving a material consideration of which the 
principal element is a substantial property payment by the groom or his relatives to the 
kinsmen of the bride,” (2) “Bride-service, i.e., marriages normally involving a substantial 
material consideration of which the principal element consists of labor or other service 
rendered by the groom to the bride’s kinsmen,” (3) Token bride-price, i.e., marriages 
normally involving only a small or symbolic bride-price as a consideration.” (4) “Gift 
exchange, i.e., marriages normally involving a reciprocal exchange of gifts of substantial 
amount between the relatives of the bride and groom or else entailing a continuing exchange 
of goods and services in approximately equal amounts between the groom or his kinsmen and 
the bride’s relatives.” (5)”Exchange, i.e., marriages normally involving a consideration in the 
form of a sister or other female relative of the groom given in exchange for the bride.” 
(6)”Absence of any significant material consideration in marriage.” 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics  
 Panel A  
 Males Females 
Individual level Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Obs Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Obs 
Age in year 1995 34.187    7.094 69,800     33.694     7.155 71,925       
Education  7.499 4.031 69,800        6.248     4.012 71,925 
 Panel B  
 B.P. Females Non B.P. Females 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Obs Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
 
Obs 
Age in year 1995 34.604 6.825 8,679 34.339 6.958 48,080 
Education  6.290 3.718 8,679 5.647 3.703 48,080 
Marriage age  19.962 3.940 8,679 18.149 3.564 48,080 
  Panel C  
    
District level Mean Standard Deviation Obs 
Intensity*   2.043  0.875 141,725   
Intensity low** 
program region  
  1.507     0.296 82,399   
Intensity high*** 
program region  
    2.785    0.869 59,326   
Notes: Panel A displays individual descriptive statistics for males and females, separately. 
Panel B displays individual descriptive statistics for females from ethnic groups engaged in 
bride pricing and for females from ethnic groups not engaged in bride pricing, separately. 
Panel C displays descriptive statistics of the INPRES program exposure on the district level.  
*Intensity denotes the number of INPRES schools built per 1,000 school-aged children. 
**Intensity low denotes the number of INPRES schools built per 1,000 school-aged children 
for districts below the average district mean. *** Intensity high denotes the number of 
INPRES schools built per 1,000 school-aged children for district above the average district 
mean. 
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Table 3. Number of female child marriages 
Marriage age  B. P. Females  Non B.P. Females 
10 7 160 
11 16 278 
12 42 746 
13 128 1,746 
14 232 3,231 
15 489 4,661 
16 639 6,012 
17 798 6,118 
Notes: This table shows the exact number of girls that are married for different ages prior to 
the age of 18 from the first stage sample. B.P. females denote females from ethnic groups that 
are involved in bride pricing. Non B.P. females denote females from ethnic groups that are 
not involved in bride pricing.  
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Table 4. Replicated results from Ashraf et al (2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Years of schooling 
             Males                                     Females 
Completion of primary school 
              Males                                Females 
Ik
Post 
* Intensityd       0.197*** 
(0.070) 
0.101 
(0.077) 
    0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
Ik
Post 
* Intensityd * Ie
BridePrice 
    
Ik
Post 
* Intensityd* Ie
NoBridePrice     
     
Ethnicity FEs *Ik
Post 
N N N N 
Ethnicity FEs  N N N N 
Ethnicity FEs *Intensityd N N N N 
District FEs * Ie
BridePrice N N N N 
Duflo Controls* Ie
BridePrice N N N N 
Duflo Controls Y Y Y Y 
District FEs Y Y Y Y 
Cohort FEs * Ie
BridePrice N N N N 
Cohort FEs Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 68,714 70,802 68,714 70,802 
Number of clusters 256 248 256 248 
Adjusted R
2 
0.173 0.244 0.125 0.181 
Notes: Column (1) and (3) shows the effect of program exposure and schooling for males. Column (2) and (4) shows the relationship between 
program exposure and schooling for females. All regressions include district of birth fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects and the interacted 
controls of Duflo (2000). Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Table 5. First stage result 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Completion of primary school 
  
       Females               Females                 B.P. Females         B.P. Females               Non B.P. Females          Non B.P. Females 
Ik
Post 
* Intensityd   0.027*** 
(0.010) 
0.027*** 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
Ik
Post 
* Intensityd * Ie
BridePrice 
     0.027*** 
(0.010) 
      0.027*** 
(0.010) 
    
Ik
Post 
* Intensityd* Ie
NoBridePrice -0.006    
(0.010) 
-0.006    
(0.010) 
    
Ethnicity FEs *Ik
Post 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ethnicity FEs  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Ethnicity FEs *Intensityd Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District FEs * Ie
BridePrice Y   Y N  N N N 
Duflo Controls* Ie
BridePrice Y   Y N  N N N 
Duflo Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cohort FEs * Ie
BridePrice Y Y  N  N N N 
Cohort FEs Y  Y  Y  Y Y Y 
Female Agriculture Y N Y N Y N 
Matrilocality N Y N Y N Y 
Number of observations 61,954 61,954 9,906 9,906 52,048 52,048 
Number of clusters 244 244 156 156 217 217 
Adjusted R
2 
0.192 0.192 0.193 0.193 0.192 0.192 
 Notes: This table shows the effect of program exposure on completion of primary school for (1)-(2) all females; (3)-(4) females from ethnic 
groups engaged in bride pricing ; (5)-(6) females from ethnic groups not engaged in bride pricing. Standard errors are clusters at the district level. 
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1.
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Table 6. The effect of education on child marriage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Completion of primary 
school 
-0.109*** 
 (0.017) 
0.335   
(0.412) 
0.334 
   (0.412) 
-0.066  
(0.354) 
-0.066 
   (0.355)    
Ethnicity FEs *Ik
Post 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Ethnicity FEs  Y Y Y Y Y 
Ethnicity FEs *Intensityd Y Y Y Y Y 
District FEs * Ie
BridePrice N N N N N 
Duflo Controls* Ie
BridePrice N N N N N 
Duflo Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y 
Cohort FEs * Ie
BridePrice N N N N N 
Cohort FEs Y Y Y Y Y 
Female agriculture  N Y N Y N 
Matrilocality N N Y N Y 
Number of observations 8,619 8,619 8,619 8,619 8,619 
Number of clusters 145 145 145 145 145 
Notes: Column (1) shows the OLS relationship on the relationship between completion of primary school and child marriage. Column (2)-(5) 
show the IV estimate of the effect of completion of primary school on (2)-(3) child marriage; (4)-(5) Indonesian legal age of marriage for 
females. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1.
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Table 7. The effect of primary education on secondary education 
 (1) (2) 
Completion of primary 
school 
-0.517    
(0.512)   
  -0.855  
(0.642) 
Ethnicity FEs *Ik
Post 
Y Y 
Ethnicity FEs  Y Y 
Ethnicity FEs *Intensityd Y Y 
District FEs * Ie
BridePrice N N  
Duflo Controls* Ie
BridePrice N N  
Duflo Controls Y Y 
District FEs Y Y 
Cohort FEs * Ie
BridePrice N N  
Cohort FEs Y Y 
Number of observations 8,619 8,619 
Number of clusters 145 145 
Notes: The table shows the effect of completion of primary schooling on secondary schooling. 
Column 1 shows the effect of primary school completion on junior high school completion. 
Column 2 shows the effect of primary school completion on secondary high school 
completion. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***p<0.01 **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Table 8. The effect of program exposure on junior high school 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table show the effect of the INPRES program exposure on completion of junior high school. Column (1) shows the effect for males and        
column (2)-(4) shows the effect for (2) all females; (3) females from ethnic groups engaged in bride pricing; (4) females from ethnic groups not engaged             
in bride pricing. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***p<0.01 **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Completion of junior high school  
          Males                                Females                             B.P. Females                    Non B.P. Females 
Ik
Post 
* Intensityd 0.020** 
(0.009) 
0.004   
 (0.009) 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
Ik
Post 
* Intensityd * Ie
BridePrice 
    
Ik
Post 
* Intensityd* Ie
NoBridePrice     
Ethnicity FEs *Ik
Post 
N N Y Y 
Ethnicity FEs  N N Y Y 
Ethnicity FEs *Intensityd N N Y Y 
District FEs * Ie
BridePrice N N N N 
Duflo Controls* Ie
BridePrice N N N N 
Duflo Controls Y Y Y Y 
District FEs Y Y Y Y 
Cohort FEs * Ie
BridePrice N N N N 
Cohort FEs Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 68,714 70,802 9,906 52,048 
Number of clusters 256 248 156 217 
Adjusted R
2 
0.150 0.177 0.257 0.161 
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